Waiting for the North-Korean-nuclear-test Godot

North Korea analysis often devolves to predicting when the next provocation will occur and then endlessly debating the “signal” that the regime was — or was not — sending to Washington.

Lost in the analytic morass is that the “what” is more important than the “when” or “why.” The next nuclear test, in addition to being another serious violation of United Nations resolutions, would indicate that Pyongyang has developed an improved generation of tactical nuclear weapons to use against U.S. forces and allies in northeast Asia.

The latest iteration in this speculative cycle is over the long-awaited seventh North Korea nuclear test. Since March, Washington and Seoul have declared that Pyongyang had completed all necessary preparations and that the nuclear test was “imminent.” Usually that would mean the nuclear device had been emplaced and the tunnel packed to contain the blast. Launch would be expected within days. 

The nuclear test was first expected during two major North Korean anniversaries in April, then during President Biden’s May trip to Asia, and now during the first major U.S.-South Korean military exercises in four years. Pyongyang’s failure to live up to our predictions generated speculation of technical difficulties with the weapon or the regime not wanting to anger Beijing in the runup to the Chinese party congress later this year. 

In addition to nuclear test preparations observed on satellite imagery, North Korea has been stepping up its threatening rhetoric. Kim Yo-jong, the North Korean leader’s increasingly powerful sister, has sharpened her bombastic tirades, particularly when they are aimed at the new Yoon Suk Yeol administration in Seoul. Ms. Kim seems to be the regime’s designated attack dog, the worse cop to Kim Jong-un’s already bad cop. 

Ms. Kim blamed South Korean anti-regime leaflets and other objects carried by balloons into North Korea for the regime’s recent outbreak of COVID-19. She warned of “deadly retaliatory” actions, up to and including “wiping out the South Korean authorities.” She also rejected the South Korean president’s offer of economic benefits in highly insulting terms while affirming the regime would never abandon its nuclear arsenal. 

Her abusive rhetoric was reminiscent of vitriolic missives she issued before North Korea blew up the inter-Korean liaison office in June 2020. At the time, she vowed the regime would bolster military forces along the demilitarized zone and warned that “our military’s patience has run out.” 

Pyongyang is once again implementing a deliberative and incremental program to raise tensions while, for now at least, being careful not to trigger strong allied responses. This year, North Korea has launched a record number of missiles, including two cruise missiles last week after a two-month hiatus. China and Russia have blocked any U.N. response to yet more North Korean violations of U.N. resolutions. 

The regime may have hoped that Seoul would capitulate, as previous South Korean President Moon Jae-in had, in this case by canceling allied combined military exercises. Instead, Mr. Yoon has taken a much firmer stance toward North Korea. He agreed with the Biden administration to resume large-scale military exercises, impose conditionality on offers of economic benefits to Pyongyang, and rebuff Chinese attempts to constrain South Korean missile defenses. 

North Korea has repeatedly rejected U.S. and South Korean entreaties for diplomatic engagement and undoubtedly will continue its binge of missile launches. Another nuclear test is also inevitable, given Mr. Kim’s January 2021 directive to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones.” 

Whenever Pyongyang pops its nuke, Washington and Seoul should resume rotational deployments of U.S. strategic assets (bombers, carriers and dual-capable aircraft) to the Korean Peninsula, augment bilateral military exercises, and step up sanctions enforcement of U.N. resolutions and U.S. laws. 

• Bruce Klingner is The Heritage Foundation’s senior research fellow for Northeast Asia. He previously served as the CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea.

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